. . . On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the Board’s determination that background prior art like Cline could not supply a missing claim limitation unless it was properly asserted in the petition as grounds for unpatentability. . . .
Introduction
Two recent Federal Circuit decisions provide valuable guidance on the challenges faced by both the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and IPR petitioners when presented with multiple prior art references in an obviousness challenge—articulating a clear motivation to combine the prior art references and adhering to procedural rules when presenting multiple references as grounds for unpatentability. The first case, Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, LLC, No. 2023-1636 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2024), involved procedural errors committed by the Board itself in drafting its decision. In that case, the Board ruled that PAN had failed to establish unpatentability for the challenged claims but neglected to make clear and specific findings about (1) whether there was a motivation to combine the asserted prior art references and (2) whether the proposed combination would render the claimed invention obvious. The second case, Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, No. 2023-1537 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11, 2024), involved procedural missteps by Intel, the IPR petitioner, in failing to (1) properly identify all prior art relevant to the challenged claim elements and (2) sufficiently present all relevant arguments supporting its claim of obviousness in its IPR petition.
Federal Circuit’s Analysis of Combined References
Palo Alto Networks v. Centripetal Networks
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Palo Alto Networks addressed U.S. Patent No. 10,530,903, which disclosed methods for correlating data packet transmissions in networks to identify malicious activity. The claims describe methods for analyzing network traffic to trace obfuscated communications back to their original sources. The invention addressed the challenge of distinguishing between benign and malicious uses of network obfuscation and provided techniques for correlating transmitted and received packets to detect and respond to potential security threats. PAN argued that the combination of two prior art references taught the claimed invention, but the Board ruled against PAN without making any clear and specific findings about PAN’s asserted motivation to combine the references or whether the asserted combination would render the invention obvious. On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, emphasizing the Board’s failure to articulate its reasoning regarding a motivation for combining the references and failure to explain how, if at all, the combined references addressed the patent’s claim limitations.
In its IPR petition, PAN relied primarily on two references: U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2014/0280778 (“Paxton”) and U.S. Patent No. 8,413,238 (“Sutton”). Paxton disclosed a system for tracking data packets across network translation boundaries, while Sutton taught notifying administrators about devices associated with malicious activity. PAN asserted that combining these teachings rendered the claimed invention obvious by showing a process where correlated data packets would trigger a transmission to an administrator, thereby addressing the each of the patent’s claim limitations.
The Board denied PAN’s IPR petition on grounds that the Board was left “with a correlation from Paxton . . . , and a transmission from Sutton . . . , but without the necessary bridge showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have appreciated that the transmission would be responsive to the correlation.” PAN Decision at 8. On appeal, the Federal Circuit was presented with the issue of whether the Board’s finding sufficiently addressed whether there was a motivation to combine the references. PAN argued that, at least, “the PTAB did not dispute that a motivation existed to combine Paxton and Sutton.” PAN Decision at 10. Centripetal, by contrast, argued that the Board’s reference to a missing “necessary bridge” demonstrates an affirmative finding that there was no motivation to combine the references. Id. The Federal Circuit, however, concluded that it could not discern any clear finding on the matter, explaining that the Board’s reference to “the necessary bridge” lacked the requisite clarity to support appellate review. Id.
In articulating the law of motivation to combine, the Federal Circuit reiterated that there is no “‘rigid and mandatory formula’” but “‘the [Board] must articulate a reason why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would combine the prior art references.’” Id. at 11 (quoting In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original)). The Federal Circuit emphasized that the PTAB’s analysis must be “‘thorough and searching,’” and provide findings supported by “‘specificity.’” Id. (quoting In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d at 1381-82). Additionally, the court explained that “‘if the Board finds no motivation to combine [references], . . . it must expressly say so and provide an adequate explanation,’” ensuring that its reasoning can be meaningfully reviewed. Id. (quoting Vicor Corp. v. SynQor, Inc., 869 F.3d 1309, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). The Board’s failure to provide such findings or explanations in this case necessitated a remand for further clarification and analysis.
The Federal Circuit addressed the next and final issue on appeal. As the court explained, “In addition to its failure to make the required motivation-to-combine finding in this case, the Board failed to resolve the very issue it had identified: ‘whether Paxton as modified by Sutton would have taught the recited transmitting responsive to the correlation.’” Id. at 12. The court noted that the Board improperly evaluated the references individually rather than in combination, as required by law. At most, the Board merely parroted Centripetal’s argument that “‘this combination is insufficient to teach the disputed limitation.’” Id. at 13. By failing to expressly assess how the asserted combination either did or did not meet the limitations of the challenged claims, the Board left this essential aspect of its analysis unexplained. On remand, the Board must expressly determine whether modifying Paxton with Sutton’s notification step would satisfy the claim limitations and render the invention obvious.
Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG
In Intel, the Federal Circuit reviewed an IPR challenge to U.S. Patent No. 8,312,301, which disclosed a multiprocessor system designed to conserve power by reducing clock frequencies when a battery’s power reserve drops below a predetermined threshold. Intel’s petition specifically relied on two prior art references as “asserted grounds of unpatentability:” U.S. Patent Application No. 2003/0152728 (“Nicol”), which described methods for dynamic voltage and frequency scaling, and U.S. Patent No. 6,684,563 (“Bhatia”), which focused on power management in multiprocessor systems. Those two references, however, failed to teach reducing clock frequencies when a battery’s power reserve drops below a predetermined threshold.
To overcome that deficiency, Intel argued that a third reference cited in the petition’s “background knowledge of the prior art” section, U.S. Patent No. 6,978,392 (“Cline”), supplied the missing claim element. The Board, however, ruled against Intel, limiting Intel’s IPR challenge solely to the teachings disclosed in Nicol and Bhatia. Although Cline arguably taught the missing claim limitation, Intel failed to include Cline in the asserted grounds of unpatentability in its IPR petition. On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the Board’s determination that background prior art like Cline could not supply a missing claim limitation unless it was properly asserted in the petition as grounds for unpatentability. The court emphasized that “Intel needed to include Cline in the asserted grounds of unpatentability set forth in its petition and persuasively show a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Cline with Nicol and Bhatia.” Intel Decision at 4. Because Intel failed to do so, the court affirmed the Board’s ruling, finding no legal error in the Board’s decision. Id. (citing Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“An agency decision can be supported by substantial evidence, even where the record will support several reasonable but contradictory conclusions”)).
In a further effort to address the missing claim element, Intel attempted to rely on the Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (“ACPI”) standard that was, itself, referenced in Bhatia. While Intel’s petition expressly noted that Bhatia referenced the ACPI standard, the petition pointed only to those sections of the ACPI addressing processor power states and power interrupts—not to the standard’s discussion of reduced clock frequency for battery management. In its IPR reply brief, Intel attempted to overcome that oversight by introducing arguments based on the ACPI’s battery management sections to address the missing claim limitation. The Board excluded these new arguments, concluding that Intel’s reply brief exceeded its permissible scope by including evidence and arguments not presented in the IPR petition itself. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion and reiterating that arguments in a petitioner’s reply must respond to issues raised by the patent owner without introducing new grounds of unpatentability. Intel Decision at 5 (citing Apple Inc. v. Andrea Elecs. Corp., 949 F.3d 697, 705 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (Board determinations regarding permissible scope of a reply examined for abuse of discretion)).
Conclusion
The Federal Circuit’s decisions in Palo Alto Networks and Intel highlight critical lessons for IPR practice. Palo Alto Networks underscores the necessity for the PTAB to provide clear and detailed findings on the motivation to combine prior art references and to evaluate them collectively rather than in isolation. Intel demonstrates the importance of procedural precision, requiring petitioners to include all necessary prior art references and arguments in their original petitions while expressly identifying them as asserted grounds of unpatentability. Together, these cases emphasize that success in IPRs hinges on both substantive rigor and procedural compliance, offering valuable guidance to practitioners and the PTAB alike.
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